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Toward a Better Understanding of...
Systemic Risk Mitigation in Dynamic 
Receivership and Auction Models
Kevin Xu
Mentor: Zachary Feinstein
Systemic risk is the risk of a collapse of an entire financial system caused by the failure 
of individual parts inside the system. Systemic risk is the culprit for many catastrophic 
financial crises, the most famous one being the 2008 global financial crises in which 
mortgage market bubble burst directly caused the collapse of investment bank Lehman 
Brothers. In order to study the systemic risk in financial systems quantitatively, Eisenberg 
& Noe, proposed a foundation network system of interconnected banks with bilateral 
obligations in a single type of asset. Bernstein, Banerjee & Feinstein incorporated time 
dynamics in the model and proposed a foundation mechanism for multi-period clearing. 
We propose receivership and auction as two specific liquidation assistance models to 
mitigate systemic risk in an extension of the Eisenberg-Noe model with time dynamics. 
We found that the receivership model mitigates financial risk and that the auction model 
increases the wealth of financial networks at current time, but worsen financial health of 
the system in the future. Studying systemic risk and augmenting Eisenberg-Noe models 
with realistic financial elements helps researchers in academia and industry to analyze 
risk contagion and financial crises. Federal banking regulators could benefit from the 
studies by evaluating financial health of institutions through the models and then adjust 
financial policies accordingly.
